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DANGEROUSNESS: A THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW
AL KATZ*
PART I**
Evening Twilight
HERE'S the delightful evening, the criminal's friend. It comes like an
accomplice, with slinking wolf-like strides. The sky shuts slowly like
a great alcove, and restless man turns into a wild beast.
0 evening, pleasant evening, desired by him whose arms can truly
say: 'Today we have toiled!'-Evening refreshes minds devoured by
savage grief, or the poring scholar whose head begins to nod, or the
back-bent workman returning home to bed. But now mischievous
demons rouse lumpishly in the air, like men intent on business, and
flounder in their flight against shutters and sheds.
Through glimmering gqs-jets wincing in the wind, Prostitution
lights up in the streets, likeCan ant-heap opening all its entrances and
exits; it weaves its furtive passage everywhere, like an enemy planning
a surprise attack; it burrows through the city's slime like a worm
filching away men's food. Here and there you hear the whistling from
kitchens, yapping of theatres, droning of orchestras; the cheap joints
whose main attraction is gambling are filling with whores and their
crony crooks, and the thieves, as well, who show no signs of idleness
or mercy, will soon be setting to work, tenderly forcing doors and
safes, so as to keep themselves for a few days and buy togs for their
molls.
0 my soul, withdraw into yourself at this grave hour, and stop
your ears against this roaringdin. It is the hour when the pangs of the
sick grow sharper. Cheerless Night clutches them by the throat, they
reach their destiny's end and draw nigh to the universal pit: the hospital is brimming with their sighs.-More than one will never again
return to take the fragrant soup at the fireside, of an evening, beside
the one he loves. And besides, most of them have never known the
solace of a home and have never livedl
BAUDELAIRE (1852)
INTRODUCTION

T HIS essay is an attempt to put together the outline of a theoretical reconstruction of the criminal law fully utilizing the concept of dangerousness. In
doing this I have tried to look at both the existing structure and the ideal
* B.S. Temple University, 1963; J.D., University of California, Berkeley 1966, LL.M.,
1967; Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York, Buffalo. This paper
was prepared while I was a member of the Research Staff of the American Bar Foundation
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structure in a broad way, and take into account what is known and what is
reasonably suspected by empirical evidence. I have covered a good deal of
ground because there is much ground to cover; the criminal law must be understood as a whole before it can be understood at all.
The essay begins with a look at the existing structure of the criminal law
(the normal version) from a slightly different perspective. The normal version
is founded on a series of propositions: dangerous behavior should be criminal;
criminal behavior means the actor is dangerous; dangerous actors should be
punished. I will try to show that these propositions are far too rigid to perform
the proper functions of the criminal law, that they depend on a system of
inferences which all but destroys the apparent reliability of the normal version,
and that they are inconsistent with a rational conception of what disposition of
offenders is supposed to achieve. Many of these shortcomings of the normal
version show up when one compares uncompleted criminal conduct (attempt)
with the theoretical concern of civil proceeding to commit the mentally ill. I will
try to show that both these processes depend on an explanation of essentially
ambiguous phenomena: physical behavior in the case of uncompleted criminal
conduct, mental state in the case of civil commitment. Finally, I will argue that
the weakness of the normal version derives in part from its failure to appreciate
the significance of rejecting the notion of punishment as an end in itself. Once
this notion is rejected modes of disposition can only be justified by their relation
to some goal, such as the prevention of future criminal behavior.
A radical reconstruction of the criminal law must always take account of
the moral foundations of th6 normal version as well as moral objections to the
consequences of radical revision. This I have tried to do principally by responding to the claims that the revised version eliminates all notions of responsibility, is contrary to the interpersonal expectations of people living in Western
societies, is damaging to the humanist conception of man as an end in himself,
opens the door to arbitrary official interference, and has the effect of abolishing
the ancient moral distinction between guilt and innocence. Necessarily, many
of these claims require the preservation of the deterrent function of the criminal law, so I will examine again some of the more sophisticated defenses of the
normal version in terms of deterrence. In particular, I will deal with the claim
that the normal version performs a socializing function essential to the maintenance of social order, a claim which I will counter with some observations
ab'out the etiology of criminal behavior.
Earlier sections of this essay omit discussion of the question of what conduct should be considered dangerous in order to deal more clearly with the structure of the normal version. I will take this up following my discussion of
deterrence. The question of what conduct should be dangerous will be examined
from two perspectives: from the perspective of the individual in society (the
"subjective" view) and from the perspective of society as a whole (the "objective" view). From both perspectives I will argue that the crucial criterion is
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whether any particular mode of behavior generates fear rather than anxiety,'
and does not merely cause annoyance or lend itself to some moral objection. In
the course of this discussion I will also deal with the problem of the individual
who is "dangerous to himself."
In the criminal law "dangerousness" should operate as the fundamental
criterion in the formulation, application and execution of legal norms. Under the
present system "dangerousness" is to some extent used in this way, but failure
to appreciate the significance and usefulness of the concept results in a haphazard choice of means to social value ends, and a misplaced reliance on the
"logic" of the system once it is set in motion. The concept of dangerousness
implies a systematic orientation toward the prevention of future harmful conduct rather than a simple reaction to past events. In turn, a futuristic orientation implies a functional rejection of the notion of criminal responsibility as
presently conceived.

In the traditional criminal law-which I shall call the normal version 2-the
concept of dangerousness justifies the legislative designation of specific behavior
as criminal. That is, the legislator perceives a given mode of behavior as being
dangerous to a given social value, and translates this perception into a norm
proscribing that behavior. For example, the supposed danger inherent in an
agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act justifies designating the agreement itself as a crime. 3 It then follows, in the normal version, that
a particular actor is considered dangerous because he has engaged in the conduct
legislatively designated as criminal. Since the behavior is criminal because it is
dangerous, the actor, under the normal version, is himself considered dangerous
and therefore liable to punishment. This sequence of propositions in the normal
version may be stated in the following way: The legislative perception of
dangerousness leads to criminal statutes; engaging in criminal behavior means
the actor is dangerous; dangerous people should be punished.
Any one of these three propositions may be the subject of controversy: One
may dispute the perception which leads to the criminal legislation; one may
dispute the inference that the existence of a provable crime means the person is
dangerous; or one may dispute the conclusion that dangerous people should be
punished. In a later section4 I will deal with the first area of controversy, but
for the present I will focus on the inference of dangerousness from criminality
and the conclusion of punishment.
1.

This distinction is developed at p. 23 infra.

2. The phrase is borrowed from

J.

GALBRArrir, THE NEW INDuSTRIAL STATE,

ch. XIX

(1967) and M. KADISH, REASON AND CONTROVERSY IN THE ARTS, ch. 2 (1968).
3. MODEL P AL CODE, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960), comments to § 5.03. Cf. United
States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 259 (1967).

4. See infra p. 21.
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II
If the normal version sequence of propositions operated logically, then in
all cases of provable crime the inference of individual dangerousness would be
drawn. Conversely, the absence of a provable crime would preclude such an
inference. Only in this posture would the normal version be a mechanical system
through which people with a potential for dangerous behavior are "distinguished" from the general population by a provable crime.
If the phrase "provable crime" referred only to the "act" implicit in the
notion of dangerous behavior, it would be simple to show that the normal
version does not operate as a logical system because not all people who engage in
the same criminal "acts" can be regarded as equally dangerous. However, to
retain the logic of the system the normal version incorporates into criminality
the notion of mens rea which, it claims, distinguishes the dangerous from the
not so dangerous as a matter of degree. Thus the normal version claim remains
that an inference of dangerousness can be logically drawn from the fact of a
provable crime as defined by the normal version. By definition, then, an actor
who was under duress, or who had been provoked, or who was in a position
requiring self defense, or who is immature, cannot be regarded as dangerous to
the same degree as other criminal "actors." If the concept of mens rea is required in order to distinguish the dangerous from the not-so-dangerous and the
non-dangerous as a matter of degree, the narrow question is whether the concept
itself renders normal version inferences of dangerousness sufficiently reliable.
Would a revised version which made an independent estimate of dangerousness,
using the fact of a provable crime as a datum (whatever that may come to
mean), be more reliable in terms of distinguishing the potentially dangerous
from those who are not? I will leave these questions until a full account of the
normal version has been set out.
III
The normal version requires that criminality be the sine qua non of dangerousness. That is, provable crime (as defined by the normal version) is the
necessary condition to a finding of dangerousness. But even the normal version
recognizes that there are people and modes of behavior which appear to be
highly threatening even though no provable crime exists in the normal version
sense. As in the case of "non-dangerous criminal acts," the normal version
handles the "dangerous non-criminal act" by redefining the notion of a provable crime in order to bring within its logic those people who are "mentally"
dangerous but who have not committed a criminal "act."
The effort to stay within the logic of the normal version is exemplified by
the definition of "uncompleted criminal conduct" as fully developed by Professor
Wechsler and reflected in the Model Penal Code.5 According to this theory, nonS. Wechsler, Jones, and Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
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criminal conduct is explicitly considered to be merely a datum from which
dangerousness may be inferred as a pre-condition to finding a provable crime.
That is, a finding of dangerousness depends on the "criminal purpose" of the
individual (his "intent" in normal version terms) as inferred from the absence
of substantial ambiguity in the datum-conduct. 6 In this situation a double
inference is required. If the defendant's datum-conduct is unambiguous in the
sense that it is the kind of conduct which cannot be rationally explained
except in its relation to completed normal version crime, the conduct itself may
be considered dangerous and therefore constitute d provable crime in the proscriptive legislative sense.7 If found guilty of an "attempt" dangerousness may
again be inferred: The fact of a provable crime means the actor is dangerous.
The strain on the normal version from this formulation of uncompleted
criminal conduct is apparent. No "act" is legislatively made criminal prior to
the event. Instead, an ad hoc "legislative" type judgment must be made as to
whether or not the conduct in question is unambiguous in its relation to a
normal version crime. The conduct becomes dangerous in the legislative sense
because it cannot rationally be explained otherwise than in its relation to "completed" criminality. Once the conduct in question is found to be dangerous in
this legislative sense it becomes a normal version crime. Since mens rea is
essential to a conviction, it may simply be inferred from the dangerousness of
the conduct. However, in this situation mens rea is in no sense an additional
factor "discovered" as a prerequisite to conviction, but a justification built into
normal version attempt. The normal version can then claim, as it does in other
Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 CoLUnE. L.
Rv. 571 (1961).
6. The Wechsler formulation requires that the act be "a substantial step in a course of
conduct" and be "strongly corroborative" of criminal purpose. I cannot see how this
formulation avoids tautology. If the act (taken as a unit) is a substantial step in a course
of conduct which is dearly criminal, it is necessarily strongly corroborative of a criminal
purpose. If an act is strongly corroborative then it is, by definition, a substantial step. The
all important criminal purpose is established by inference from conduct which is a substantial
step, i.e., conduct which is strongly corroborative. Thus the Wechsler formulation, while
appearing to be defining two distinct elements which are established by independent data,
really only requires a single element: conduct which is relatively unambiguous in its relation
to completed criminality. Lack of ambiguity entails the conclusion that the conduct is a
substantial step, and dears the way for an inference of criminal purpose. Mens rea, in
Wechsler's law of attempt, is a pure fiction.
Furthermore, to the extent Wechsler's system relies on conduct to prove criminal purpose and therefore dangerousness, the formulation makes important probability estimates
which are entirely implicit. The notion of conduct which is unambiguous in its relation to
completed criminality (strongly corroborative of criminal purpose) implies a probability
estimate: a given mode of conduct will more often lead to completed criminality than not.
Wechsler's entire system with respect to attempts, solicitation and conspiracy depends on
such estimates. (In this connection see the analysis in Cole, Windfall and Probability: A
Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law, 52 CAr.r. L. REv. 459, 498-512 (1964). Wechsler's use
of attempted stautory rape cases is particularly illustrative of these observations. With those
cases, compare State v. Green, 388 P.2d 362 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1964).
7. The act of flight subsequent to the commission or accusation of a crime is the
prototype ambiguous act. See 1, J. WrcmnoRE, EvIDxncE § 173 (3d ed. 1940); S. FEnuD,
Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law, 2 COLL. PAERS 13, 23
(1906); Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767, 773 (D.C. Cir., 1963).
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cases, that individual dangerousness may be inferred from the fact of a provable crime. This is true, certainly in the normal version law of attempt, because
it is a tautology.
But there are instances in which the very ambiguousness of the conduct
seems to make it threatening. This is generally true where the behavior of an
individual appears to be so unreasonable in its context that it raises the question
whether the individual can be "counted on" to behave lawfully iii the future.
Real doubt that he can be "counted on" in this sense raises the possibility that
he might be dangerous-but even the normal version notion of uncompleted
criminal conduct provides no means for making a reliable determination.
Here the determination of dangerousness may be made through "civil"
commitment of the mentally ill. No effort is made in this situation to assimilate
this category of person or behavior into the normal version by, for example,
limiting commitment to those persons who would have been found "guilty, but
insane" had they in fact committed a provable crime as defined by the normal
version. Rather, in these cases the conduct is taken as a datum, but not for the
purpose of rendering it into an act dangerous in itself-as in the case of uncompleted criminal conduct. The conduct in these cases is too ambiguous to justify
disposition within a matrix of normal version theory and lay experience. The
relevant matrix for considering dangerous but not criminal cases must be one
of scientific theory and specialized experience-psychology and psychiatryin order to supply the data necessary to rationally justify disposition. The
datum-conduct never comes to be considered dangerous "in itself," but is used
in order to (reliably) determine whether or not the person is dangerous "in
himself." Civil commitment, in this posture, is the reciprocal of the law of attempt as formulated by the normal version. That is, civil commitment infers the
possibility of future dangerous conduct from a finding of a dangerous mental
condition, where the normal version infers mens rea from a finding of dangerous
conduct.
IV
Having considered now both the center and the fringes of the normal version, I can consider the basic question: Does the incorporation of mens rea
into the normal version definition of crime render normal version inferences of
individual dangerousness sufficiently reliable?
The statement "criminality implies dangerousness" could be defended as
a logical statement (either true or false) only on the hypothesis that the legislative definition of normal version criminality is sufficiently precise to preclude
"illogical" cases. That is, all cases in which the crime of murder in the first
degree has been proved must involve comparably dangerous actors for the
normal version assertion to be reliable. If we know from experience that illogical
cases are not precluded, then the normal version statement must be one of
probability and not logic. The normal version claim, therefore, can be taken to
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mean that all persons convicted of a particular offense are probably equally
dangerous.
Primarily, the actual consequences of normal version dispositions demonstrate that its initial classification of comparably dangerous offenders is highly
unreliable. For example, in California the crime of selling narcotics to a minor
by an adult carries a statutory sentence of from 10 years to life with a minimum
eligible parole date of 10 years. Yet for those released in 1965 who had been
convicted of this offense, more than half had served only 4Y2 years and none had
served more than 82 years. The point here is that, absent some post sentencing
inquiry into the dangerousness of the individual, the normal version probability
statement "criminality implies dangerousness" in itself is unreliable.8
Second, the "mental element" in normal version criminality must, in most
cases, be inferred from the "circumstances." That is, for the purpose of establishing a normal version provable crime the "mental state" of the actor at the
time of the act must be known. Of course, this can only be known by inference
even where there is a confession. But since the only purpose of the inference is
to classify the actor in accordance with normal version categories, the scope of
relevant evidence as to mental condition is constricted in order to be manageable
within a matrix of common experience. Generally, only that behavior which
relates to the particular event (the datum-conduct) is relevant for this purpose.9
This is made abundantly clear in the normal version concept of uncompleted
criminal conduct discussed above: The relevant mental state of the actor is
inferred from the absence of ambiguity in the datum-conduct. But, I submit, the
handling of the "non-criminal but dangerous" individuals in "civil" commitment
cases contradicts the necessity of this constriction of the relevant evidence in the
normal version inference of mental state. Civil commitment procedures show
that it is both possible and necessary to determine dangerousness by using more
than the datum-conduct as a basis for inference in the later cases. Why is it
either not possible or not necessary to do so where the datum-conduct is less
8. Anna Freud has warned against the use of overt behavior to categorize individuals
for the purpose of diagnosis. A. FPEuD, NoRAirY AD PATHoLoGy" 3N CHILDH'OOD 108-47
(1965). See also E. ElUxsoN, IDaNTry: Youm An CRIsis 252-56 (1968). In his recent
paper, Joseph Goldstein suggests that "this warning does not lead to the conclusion that all
legislatively defined categories-such as thief, murderer, rapist, conspirator, juvenile delinquent, or committable mentally-ill person are inappropriate for all purposes. It may be a
useful and workable legislative strategy to create such categories as a basis for sorting out
those who are entitled to one legal process or another or who may or may not be considered
appropriate objects of community anger. But it is a limitation of the strategy that such
categories cannot serve as a basis for determining who shall be provided with what therapeutic regime or assigned what institutional setting for rehabilitative purposes." Goldstein,
Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1070 (1968). As I am arguing here,
there are categories of conduct which are useful as data for the limited purpose of justifying
initial control, but not as a basis for inferring dangerousness.
9. "The potential significance of drunkenness for this purpose [exculpation] is the
same as that of ignorance or mistake of fact-namely, that it may negate a mental state
that otherwise would be 'established circumstantially by proof of defendant's conduct."
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
CoLum. L. Rxv. 1425, 1440 (1968) [emphasis supplied].

7
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ambiguous-in the normal version sense of uambiguousness? The normal version
reply can only be that where the datum-conduct is relatively unambiguous an
inference of "bad" mental state is sufficiently reliable. The reliability of the
normal version determination of dangerousness, then, is a function of the relative ambiguity of conduct. The probability statement "criminality implies
dangerousness" is reliable only to the extent the datum-conduct contains a
"sufficient" amount of information to enable an inference of dangerousness. This
renders the normal version quite inadequate.
Recent inter-disciplinary research, such as James Marshall's "IntentionIn Law and Society," introduces substantial evidence that human intent involves
psycho-social situations which are not reflected by mens rea, and which cannot
be administered within the present framework of contentious litigation. Marshall
seems to conclude that, as a consequence, the criminal process must ask two
distinct questions: Was the defendant historically involved in the act to an
extent sufficient to impose causative responsibility, and what mode of disposition will remove his dangerous tendencies? In effect the argument is "not that
the presence or absence of the guilty mind is unimportant, but that mens rea
has, so to speak.. . got into the wrong place."' 0
Marshall brings together contemporary psychological and sociological
material bearing on the question of "free choice"--the phrase he uses to define
the legal significance of "intent." The thrust of this evidence is that psychosocial dynamics always operate to limit the fund of alternatives from which any
particular individual is able to choose." Therefore, to the extent a choice pattern is either assumed or imposed upon an individual a finding of intent is
2
artificial and not a finding of fact.1
Marshall makes the normative argument that if the legal concept of free
choice does not comport with the scientific understanding of that phenomenon,
the legal process is unrealistic-or, more significantly, unjust. The injustice
arising from this failure to fully utilize the data available from the social and
biological sciences leads Marshall to conclude that the existing modes of legislative definition and judicial determination must be revised.
The simple requirement that the psycho-social situation of the defendant
be taken into account might not necessitate radical revision of the criminal law
process were it not for scientific doubts about the validity of imposing moral
judgments on offenders. That is, the psycho-social situation of the trier may lead
to moral judgments based on irrelevant, inaccurate or even "immoral" perceptions. If this is so, no process which implies a finding of fault can be deemed
reliable within the limits of tolerance-whatever one assumes those limits to be.
10.

B. WooToix, CRIME AND THE CxmxN'A

53 (1963).

11. Cf. S. HAILECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DnLEiImrms or CRnm ch. 6 (1967).
12. "Actually, the
or persecution may be
those which motivate
survival in either case."

person whose criminal behavior is primarily engendered by poverty
motivated by forces which are just as powerful and unrelenting as
the emotionally disturbed offender. Crime may be necessary for
Id. at 211.
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Taken together with the complexities inherent in any "realistic" inquiry into the
defendant's intent, this failure of reliability means that a fundamental revision
of the criminal law system is essential. The suggestion that the trial process be
confined to an inquiry into historical involvement, and that all questions of
intent be considered as only relevant to sound disposition, achieves this result.
The normal version response to these criticisms dovetails with the objection I assume it would make to my characterization of the third normal version
proposition: "dangerous people should be punished." The normal version claim
here would be that even if its inference of dangerousness from the fact of a
provable crime is not highly reliable, there are ways of differentiating punishment to reflect "dangerousness" subsequent to the formal imposition of sentence.
I will deal with this claim first by considering the meaning of the third normal
version imperative, then by considering the implications of reliance on a post
sentencing process.
My characterization of the third proposition "dangerous people should be
punished" is unfair (and inaccurate) to the extent that the "modern" normal
version no longer regards punishment as an end in itself but as a means to some
other end. This development is significant in relation to the concept of dangerousness. So long as punishment was an end in itself, something regarded as
"good," it was not necessary to ask whether punishment served any practical
social purpose. When punishment is regarded as a means to some independent
end, one may legitimately open up argument as to the nature of the end and
its relationship to punishment as a means. If the ends question can be opened
for argument, then it is valid to claim that the concept of dangerousness should
be carefully and consistently applied as the criteria for determining the mode
and extent of coercive disposition.
The normal version reply is that subsequent to sentencing, institdltions
such as parole boards and adult authorities perform this precise function: the
mode of disposition and its duration is determined according to the "needs" of
the person-which includes an estimation of his dangerousness.
If this is true as a practical matter, then it can be asked whether the concept of mens rea performs any function at all in the normal version definition
of criminality. On the one hand, if the normal version definition of criminality
truly separated the dangerous from the not-so-dangerous and the non-dangerous,
then the post sentencing procedure would be superfluous. On the other hand, the
necessity of a post sentencing procedure renders superfluous the incorporation
of the concept of mens rea into the normal version definition of criminality. The
normal version performs a task which should be comprehensive and fully integrated by piecemeal and fragmented procedures. Would it not be better, then,
to eliminate mens rea from the definition of criminality, and save all such evidence relevant to the question of disposition (the ends question) for a separate
proceeding to fully and adequately determine dangerousness?
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V
I will deal with the difficulties in this suggestion by responding to two
"horrors": The first is the spectre of the "criminal" who goes free because he
is found to be not dangerous in the sense of his potential for future criminal
behavior. The second is the spectre of the man who has "done nothing wrong"
but who exhibits a substantial potential for future dangerous behavior.
The normal version has not recognized the implication in its rejection of
punishment as an end in itself. Where punishment is an end in itself the fact of
a provable crime can validly serve as a necessary and a sufficient condition for
punishment. With the rejection of punishment as an end in itself the question
arises where a provable crime is a sufficient condition for coercive disposition. The answer to this question depends on the nature of the end. If the
systemic goal is the prevention of dangerous behavior in the future, reliance
upon the fact of a provable crime as a sufficient condition for punishment can
be justified only by establishing a causative relationship6 between the coercive
disposition and the future conduct. Given this goal, the retention of punishment
can be rational only if it is a practical or a scientific means to an independent
end-the prevention of future dangerous conduct. The normal version fails to
see that this change in the function of punishment changes the "purpose" of the
entire process. When punishment is considered good in itself the process as a
whole looks backward in time. But if punishment is merely a means to a pragmatic end (preventing dangerous behavior) the process as a whole becomes
forward looking. If the process is forward looking the fact of a provable
crime cannot be a sufficient condition for punishment unless, in the particular
case, there is potential for future dangerous behavior, and unless punishment
eliminates that potential in some way.
In consequence, both the proposition "criminality means dangerousness"
and the proposition "dangerous people should be punished" are statements of
probability relating to the future and not logical imperatives. The horribleness of
the two "horrors" noted above arises from lack of confidence in the justifiability
of making statements of probability undisguised by moral condemnations. The
normal version tolerates its faulty assumptions about dangerousness only because
the practical effect of its judgments on future conduct is of secondary importance to its desire for moral righteousness.
VI
An explicitly futuristic system-what I shall call the revised version13
would eliminate the notion of mens rea from the definition of criminality.
Revised version criminality would include only an enumeration of datumconduct which is considered dangerous in the legislative sense. As a matter of
process, the initial inquiry would ascertain only whether a given defendant was
13.

WoolTox, supra note 10 at 52-53.
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historically involved in the datum-conduct in question. If the given defendant is
found to have been historically involved in the datum-conduct, then a further
proceeding would be necessary to determine the sense in which and the extent
to which the particular defendant is dangerous. In this proceeding all information which is relevant to the task of assessing the character problems of the
defendant and the probability of his engaging in future dangerous behavior
would be considered. In this way the essential task of arriving at the best
mode of disposition can be performed unclouded by rules of evidence and
problems of testimonial competence which are designed to serve other purposes.
But the revised sequence does not in terms account for dangerous individuals who have not engaged in the datum-conduct enumerated as dangerous
in the legislative sense. The principal reason for this is that on the basis of
existing information the extent to which persons presently subjected to "civil"
commitment have not engaged in normal version criminal "acts" is unclear. If it
be found that for the most part such persons have engaged in the datum-conduct envisioned by the revised version, then no special provision would have
to be made for this type of dangerousness. On the other hand, if there are a
sufficient number of instances of dangerous behavior where there has been no
datum-conduct in the revised version sense, then either those persons would
have to be considered without the realm of legal concern as a matter of policy,
or brought within the revised version. The latter could be done by substituting
a probable cause proceeding for the initial stage proceeding in revised version
criminality. The probable cause proceeding would require sufficient showing of
potential dangerousness to "bind-over" the individual for a full determination of
dangerousness in a second stage revised version proceeding.
Whether one accepts this brief sketch of the revised version or does not
see it as a preferred alternative to the normal version, the question remains:
What constitutes dangerousness and how can that potential (for it is not an
entity or a thing or even a quality) be estimated? At present we have only negative information: the normal version punishes in some cases where punishment
is unnecessary and in others where it obviously does no good in terms of future
behavior. A real concern with dangerous behavior, as distinguished from a concern which merely masks a primary interest in vengeance, must see that whatever "other" aims the criminal law may have, 14 concentrated attention is due
to the problem of dangerousness.
VII
The revised version does not totally eliminate the notion of responsibility
from the criminal law. "Causal responsibility" is reflected in the revised version
first stage proceeding to determine historical involvement. "Capacity responsibility" is reflected in the second stage proceeding to determine the individual's
14.

Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law,

23 L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 401 (1958).
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potential for dangerous behavior. 15 Admittedly, the revised version does not
reflect any other sense of the term responsibility. This does not mean, however,
that the revised version cannot reflect the moral outrage of the community
which may be aroused by a particularly intolerable crime. On the contrary, the
revised version contemplates that within the second stage proceeding proper
consideration will be given to the moral seriousness of the offense within the
context of any contemplated therapeutic regime.16 In addition, the moral outrage of the community may have relevance independent of therapy. Two exemplary hypothetical situations may help to clarify this latter area of relevance.
Suppose a case involving a particularly intolerable offense committed by
an individual found to have a low potential for future dangerous behavior. It
may be necessary, in such a case, to provide for a period of incarceration even
though the individual has a low potential for dangerous behavior. This "cooling
off" period would allow for the satisfaction of public moral outrage, and provide
an opportunity for therapeutic measures which will increase the reliability of
the original estimation that the offender had a low potential for future dangerous
behavior.
At the other extreme, suppose a case which arouses little or no public moral
outrage even though the offender has a high potential for future criminal behavior. Perhaps the best example of this would be the pathological shoplifter.
Creative disposition is essential in this type of case. The absence of moral outrage obviates the necessity of a "cooling off" period, but a hypothetically poor
prognosis seems to require incarceration nevertheless. However, some less severe
mode of disposition is in order because of the relative moral innocuousness of
the offense. Under the revised version it would be possible to subject the offender
to outpatient treatment while protecting property owners by putting them on
notice and providing a means for returning the shoplifted goods.
Moral criticism has been directed at theories similar to the revised version
on the ground that as a consequence of its premises people would be unable to
order their lives within the boundaries of the law in order to maximize the area
of free choice. 17 This criticism implies that the revised version contributes to
1i. Hart, Varieties of Responsibility, 83 L.Q. Rxv. 346 (1967) reprinted and revised as
Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution, in H.L.A. Hart, PUImSHMENT AND REsPoNsmmILTy
210 (1968) [hereinafter cited PuNI,_S.INT AND REsPoNsmrTY].
16. "However, in designating a criminal as acute or chronic, we must take into consideration the seriousness of the crime or crimes committed, as well as the frequency and
time factor. Otherwise, an individual who commits one premeditated murder would be
considered simply an acute criminal, while another individual who repeatedly commits harmless or nuisance thefts would be considered a chronic offender. Obviously, this is wrong
because the first individual is more dangerous than the second, even though the latter in
all probability has a personality defect. Of course, this might very well be true of the
murderer, too, and although a man who commits murder may not necessarily be psychotic,
he might display emotional or mental symptoms. His personality make-up is involved too
much with his act to put him into the category of an acute offender." D. ADRAIMMSEN,
TE PSYCHOLOGY oF Can a 122 (1960).
17. Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNSNHMENT AND RIsroNSinn=IY 158, 180-81.
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public insecurity in the sense that behavior which is the consequence of mistake
or accident may give rise to criminal investigations and thereby increase the occasions of official interference.18
This line of criticism does not distinguish the revised version from the
normal version. Under the latter an assault which is only "apparently" accidental
would rationally give rise to further investigation where there is some doubt
regarding the accidental quality of the assault. Under the revised version further
investigation would be required for the same reasons and no others-under the
assumption that a reasonable official would conclude that an accidental assault
gives rise to no suspicion that the assailant is dangerous. Of course not all officials
are reasonable. But the revised version in no way broadens the discretion of
unreasonable officials.
Another, perhaps more crucial moral objection to the revised version is the
claim that people ought to and do regard themselves and each other as people
and not merely as manipulable bodies.' 9 Because of this distinction moral judgments arise among men as a consequence of whether a given act is accidental or
purposeful. Thus the victim of an assault reaches different conclusions about his
future dealings with the assailant depending on whether the blow was purposeful
or accidental. "Shall I be your friend or enemy? Offer soothing words? Or return the blow?"' 20 I agree that the law ought to reflect these fundamental distinctions which "pervade the whole of our social life," and that "it would fail
to do [so] if it treated men merely as alterable, predictable, curable or manipulable things."' I also agree that the victim's perception of the purposeful nature
of the assault may play a significant role in ordering his future relations with
the assailant. But certainly this would be true if the only concern of the victim
were with the dangerousness of the assailant. One does not ordinarily become
friends with a violently aggressive person. One may offer soothing words, under
some circumstances, if the words are likely to be effective, or one might return
the blow if that would appear to be most effective. The point here is that each
of these responses corresponds to the perceived dangerousness of the assailant
18. Changing Conceptions of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSLITY
186, 206.
19. Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PuNIS !raNT AND RESPONsramiTy 182. This, I take it, is the Kantian moral imperative. For other expressions of the
point see D. DAuBE, CoLLABORATioN WITH TYRANNY jN RABiNic LAW (1965) and J. PiE,
YOU AND THE NEW MoRALITY 70 (1967).
PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNSISILITY supra note 15 at 183.
21. Id. There is no better example of the employment of men as manipulable things
than in the Model Penal Code. The Code allows a judge to withhold probation and refuse
to suspend sentence even if "there is no undue risk that during the period ...the defendant
will commit another crime," and even if the defendant is not "in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution," so long as
the judge believes that "a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime." Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code,
68 CoLUm. L. Rav. 1425, 1451 (1968), quoting § 7.01(1) of the Code. See also § 305.9(1)
expressing a similar criteria with respect to parole. Compare the material in notes 22 and
44 infra.
20.
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and purports to have some effect on his future behavior. It may well be that
these responses are morally determined; it is equally likely that they are practical repsonses to perceptions of relative dangerousness. The effort of the revised
version is to make these responses more suitable for the occasion by knowing
more about the assailant. This does not necessarily mean that man is being
treated as a means rather than an end in himself. On the contrary, the revised
version seeks to accommodate the needs of the individual with the pressures of
his society by refusing to classify assailants according to faulty and often arbitrary categories. Surely it is not less moral to protect future victims by treating
assailants in accordance with their needs and more moral to simply to return
the blow.
Finally, there is the objection that dangerous but untreatable offenders cannot be imprisoned because society has no right to use an individual as an example unless it can show that he could have acted otherwise than he did.2 2 This
objection is practical as well as (or perhaps rather than) moral. Attempting to
deter others by punishing one who could not have acted otherwise is irrational
quite apart from being barbaric. Punishment in this case has the same general
deterrent value as strict liability-none. However, the revised version is not less
moral than the normal version by virtue of its efforts to secure the dangerous
but untreatable. Under the normal version "insane" but untreatable persons who
are dangerous are secured without regard for the deterrent value of the incarceration. Surely it would not be immoral to handle the sane but untreatable in
the same way-so long as we do not indulge the fiction that such incarceration
is in the service of general deterrence. The advance contained in the revised
version is that it hopes to avoid calling all but a very few offenders sane but untreatable.
On a lower level of abstraction it has been claimed that insofar as the revised version eliminates the distinction between "guilt" and "innocence" it
rejects the goal of general deterrence in favor of a system of imperfect predictions.2 That is, since the revised version is not concerned with "condemnation
and conviction" of offenders this "means of reinforcing habits and commitments
of law abidingness" is being abandoned. 24 The revised version, it is said, because
22. Changing Conceptions of Responsibility, in PUNzSmz.mrNT "ND REspoNsiWLITr 207.
I have elsewhere suggested that the more carefully one examines the psycho-social history of
criminal behavior the more difficult this becomes. Katz, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 640 (1969). Compare: The "equilibrium of justice is upset by the desire" to deter
others through punishment of the individual; "the judge is obliged to forget the particular
individual he has in front of him. In such a case the penalty imposed is no longer designed
to be just, for the offender merely comes to serve the presumed interest of the community.
An exemplary penalty is an authoritarian proceeding quite unrelated to true justice." ANcE,
Some Thoughts on the Problem of Deterrence, in Camx AND CUrTURE 375, 38 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1968). Professor Wechsler and the Model Penal Code are to the contrary. See
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
CoLum. L. REv. 1425, 1434 (1968).
23. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CA.m. L.J. 273 (1968).
24. Id. at 287. The normal version defense here is further weakened by evidence

pointing to the fact that in practice, the significance of the distinction between guilt and
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of its futuristic orientation, rejects the goal of general deterrence as understood
in the normal version.
This criticism is centrally inconsistent. On the one hand it is claimed that
the revised version cannot eliminate the onus of punishment merely by being
concerned with treatment.25 On the other hand the claim is that the revised
version can have no general deterrent value because it eliminates punishment. 26
But certainly it must be true that if the disposition meted out by the revised
version will continue to be regarded as punishment, the revised version will have
no lesser deterrent force than the normal version. However, even if it is true that
the revised version eliminates punishment as the institutional response to dangerous behavior, it does not follow that revised version dispositions will be regarded by potential offenders as either pleasant or innocuous. Quite apart from
the fact that the critical claim here assumes a rationality in human behavior
which it is not prepared to substantiate, 27 it simply does not follow that because
revised version dispositions bear directly on the potential for future dangerous
behavior they are inherently noncoercive.
Perhaps the heart of this critical claim is that there is some powerful moral
medicine (general deterrence) in the pronouncement of guilt which is eliminated
by the revised version. This, of course, is not a moral claim but an empirical one
which, again, the normal version is unable to defend. I might just as readily
assert that the adjudication of dangerousness has an equal moral impact which
functions in the service of general deterrence.
It may be true that "the decline of guilt . . . also means, and necessarily,
the decline of innocence," 28 but only in the philosophical sense that if none of us
are guilty then none of us are innocent: 29 guilt is a relative matter. This does
innocence has almost disappeared. "The attention given by trial and appellate courts to
questions of sufficiency of evidence and due process, however, should not divert attention
from the fact that the great bulk of cases are disposed of at early stages where the primary
question frequently is, 'What ought to be done with this individual who is probably guilty
of a crime?'" McIntyre, Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. ClIM. L.C. &
P.S. 463, 466 (1969).
25. Kadish, supra note 23, at 286.
26. Id. at 288. Compare: "It is, therefore, inaccurate or at any rate, a gross oversimplification, to claim, as is sometimes done, that when punishment in the traditional sense
is replaced by a form of treatment, this might result in reducing the deterrent effect of the
penalty.... [It is evident that methods of treatment, rationally applied in conformity with
modern penological ideas, do not in any way diminish the deterrent effect of appearance
before the court or the sentence imposed. This is so because the treatment envisaged is planned
and carried out in the post-trial phase." Ancel, Some Thoughts on the Problem of Deterrence, in CamI AND CLTruRa 375, 383 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1968).
27. See Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 703.
28. Kadish, supra note 23, at 285.
29. "As for the law of retaliation, it must be admitted that even in its primitive form
it is legitimate only between two individuals of whom one is absolutely innocent and the
other absolutely guilty. Certainly the victim is innocent. But can society, which is supposed
to represent the victim, claim a comparable innocence? Is it not responsible at least in part,
for the crime which it represses with such severity? This theme has been frequently developed
elsewhere, and I need not continue a line of argument which the most varied minds have
elaborated since the eighteenth century. Its principal features can be summed up, in any
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not mean, however, that without guilt as a verbal handle we have no reliable
method for distinguishing dangerous individuals from the general population,
nor does it mean that banishing the function of moral condemnation from the
criminal law will generate wholesale anxiety. 30 Anxiety is generated only when
it is unclear what modes of behavior are acceptable and what modes are unacceptable. Anxiety will be allayed by a process which generates reasonable confidence in its ability to make fair and reliable distinctions. The normal version
can claim no special competence in this task.
VIII
The psycho-social assumptions of normal version theory connect the political arguments offered to justify its theory and the moral and "empirical" arguments offered to justify punishment in a particular case. This psycho-social tie
seriously questions the morality of normal version punishment. In summary, the
normal version argument is that the legality of politically imposed norms depends on general loyalty to the interests of the social whole. If the social whole
commands the loyalty of the masses generally it can feel justified in demanding
individual conformity to group legality. Where the demand itself is not sufficient
to effect compliance, the social whole may provide a system of pains and penalties which will exact the necessary obedience.
The notion of loyalty is of great political significance. When general loyalty
to the interests of the social whole weakens, the security of the political order
and the effective strength of its dogma is in jeopardy. Insofar as legality is a
specific means of social ordering, it too depends on general loyalty for its effectiveness. However, less than universal compliance with specific legal norms can
be tolerated so long as the demand for universal compliance with legality is
justified by general loyalty to the interests of the social whole. Put another way,
the justness of demanding compliance with legality largely depends on general
loyalty.
Though general loyalty may be a necessary condition for legality, it is never
practically sufficient to command universal compliance with specific legal norms.
Since the need for compliance cannot rest on general loyalty, a system of pains
and penalties is imposed which, it is hoped, will exact the necessary complicase, by observing that every society has the criminals it deserves." Camus, Reflections on
the Guillotine (Richard Howard tr.), reprinted from 1 EVERGomEN Rvimw No. 3 (1957) in
TE LAW As
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512, 533 (E. London ed. 1960). Compare Sarbin: "The dangerous

offender is an outcome in large measure of the institutions we have created to manage and
mould him." The Dangerous Individual: An Outcome of Social Identity Transformations,
7 BmrisH JouRNAI oF CRnmNOLOGY, 285, 294 (1967). "We commit the crime of damning
some of our fellow citizens with the label 'criminal.' And having done this, we force them
through an experience that is soul-searching and dehumanizing. In this way we exculpate
ourselves from the guilt we feel and tell ourselves that we do it to 'correct' the 'criminal' and
make us all safer from crime. We commit this crime every day that we retain our present
stupid, futile, abominable practices against detected offenders." K. MENNINGER, ThE Canir
OF PUNISHMENT 9 (1968).
30. Kadish, supra note 23, at 288.
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ance. 31 But the relation between the individual's sense of loyalty and the failure
of specific compliance is unclear. 32 Is the failure of specific compliance related
to a failure in the development of the individual's sense of loyalty, or can the
individual maintain basic loyalty to the interest of the social whole while not
complying with specific legal norms? This question is particularly important
because if, in a particular case, noncompliance is related to the individual's
lack of basic loyalty, any system of punishment designed to exact compliance
will necessarily fail to the extent it does not promote the individual's sense of
basic loyalty. On the other hand, if individual deviance is not inconsistent with
a basic sense of loyalty, punishment may be effective whether or not it promotes the individual's sense of basic loyalty.
My hypothesis is that the serious deviant behavior with which society is
principally concerned is engaged in by individuals who lack a developed sense
of basic loyalty. If this hypothesis is correct, the normal version attempt to
exact compliance will necessarily fail because normal version punishment bears
no relation to the development of a sense of basic loyalty. A brief examination
of the "empirical" rationalizations for normal version punishment will bear
this out.
The classic rationalization for normal version punishment is that it imposes the consequence of pain which most people will seek to avoid by compliance with the substantive norms. 33 Similarly, pain will intimidate the individual
on whom it is inflicted so that, to avoid further pain, he will not repeat his
criminal behavior. This defense of punishment is entered with the usual assumption of "all other things being equal." That is, the model is free market economics.
Punishment prevents criminal behavior by all those who are "at the margin."
Individuals who would violate the substantive norm but for the painful consequences provided by punishment are thereby deterred. It is notable that this
defense of normal version punishment never attempts to justify punishment
when all other things are not equal. The normal version never attempts to explain the function of punishment with regard to those individuals who are not
marginal with respect to pain, and it ignores the possibility that in many instances individual behavior is not crucially affected by the potential infliction of
pain in the future. 34 But these responses to the classical defense of punishment
31.

H. KELSEN, WHAT Is JUSTIcE 235 (1957).

32. "It should perhaps be stressed that they [the nonpsychotic, non-mental defective
criminal patients] deviate so clearly in interhuman relations that they have no reason to feel
solidarity with society at large. They consider themselves outcasts and find it easier to develop relationships with people who are also outcasts." G. STi.Uur, TREATING THE "UNTREATABLE" 7 (1968).
33. It is interesting to observe that both Bentham and Freud recognized that any sort
of behavior or motivation could provide pleasure to the individual; Freud went so far as to
identify motivation with pleasure. The difference between these two men lies in their ethical
notions of freedom. See P. R=-, FaRxm: TIE MuM oF THE MORALIST 324ff. (1959).
34. One way of looking at legislative grading is as an assumption that everybody is marginal with respect to pain, and in the same way. In other words, marginality has more to
do with categories of acts than it does with individual personality.
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are well known, and I am more particularly interested in the modern explanation.
The psychology of the modern defense of punishment is more sophisticated.
Now it is said that punishment for crime makes "more vivid" the seriousness
with which society regards the underlying norms. Vividness is significant because
it is a condition of obedience that the importance of the norm to the group be
conveyed. Punishment is thus a tool of socialization. 5 There are two difficulties
in this defense of punishment, one of conception and one of execution, and both
difficulties converge at the notion of loyalty.
The difficulty of conception is that the "views" of the group can only play
a positive role in the life of an individual who is in reality, and who feels himself to be, part of the group. There is no point in making group values more
vivid by punishment if the individual has not developed a sense of solidarity
with the relevant group. 36 This point is more complex than the rhetoric of
alienation would have it. Solidarity with the group is, in the developmental
sense, the sine qua non of respect for group created legality. This is the importance of recognizing the "common root" in the terms loyal and legal. 37 Without
solidarity there is only the experience of the solitary. The solitary individual
can only experience frustration and helplessness-not cooperation. It is no surprise, then, to find that helplessness is a predominant characteristic of criminal
offenders. 38 Nor is it surprising to find a high incidence of arbitrary and frequent
physical punishment in the early life of offenders, as well as a high incidence of
fragmenting tension in the family.3 9 It is not unreasonable to suppose (though
it is somewhat speculative) that these features of frequent unreasonable punishment and dysfunctional families adversely affect the development of a sense of
solidarity in the individual. This adverse effect may be particularly serious where
the society at large appears to reinforce feelings of rejection, pain and helplessness.
The second difficulty with the modern defense of punishment, one of execution, is related to the developmental characteristics already mentioned. In modern times punishment almost exclusively takes the form of exclusion and
isolation. That is, the normal version means prison when it speaks of punishment. For the offenders to whom the above noted characteristics apply, prison
35. H. PACKER, TaE Limrrs OF T E CRnmAL SANCTION 42-43 (1968). But see Katz,
Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 640 (1969).
36. Because the sense of isolation is so significant, in treating deviants with "character
disorders" group therapy stresses the fact that "crime is an interpersonal problem" and
attempts to build a "feeling of solidarity" among inmates. G. STriiau, TREATING THz "UxTREATABLE" 70, 72 (1968).
37. "'Loyal' and 'legal' have the same root, linguistically and psychologically, for legal
commitment is an unsafe burden unless shouldered with a sense of sovereign choice and
experienced as loyalty. To develop that sense is a joint task of the consistency of individual
life history and the ethical potency of the historical process." E. ERsSxON, IDENrITY, YOUTU
AND CRisis 236

(1968).

38. S. HALLEcK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DLmrmuAS or CRIME 76, 79, 80-82 (1967).
39. D. ABRAHAMSEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRn= ch. III (1960).
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as punishment is singularly absurd. The negative identity of a prisoner, one of
outcast, is certainly not foreign to the offender's life history. Thus prison only
reinforces his sense of isolation, rejection and helplessness; only confirms his
negative self-image. 40 Furthermore, the lack of rational relation between prison
as punishment and the specific harm done to society is precisely the sort of punishment "expected" by an individual whose history was inconsistent with the
development of group solidarity. This point requires further elaboration.
Prior to the age when children begin to respond to, and take part in, the
regulative experience of group interaction, they are "egocentric" and experience
only the "morality of constraint." 41 That is, the regularities of behavior imposed
by adults are regarded as implicitly valid and binding, and punishment by adults
for violations of these externally imposed rules is regarded as just and necessary.
If punishment does not follow violation there is a breach in nature, so to speak.
At this stage punishment need not be related to practical ends, but will be re42
garded as just if it is imposed authoritatively.
From this one can easily see the effect of punishment on an individual who
does not fully develop from the "egocentric stage" characterized by adult constraint to the "cooperative stage" characterized by the development of group
participation and a sense of solidarity. Punishment continues to be experienced
as in the nature of things, and as following necessarily from the breach of a legal
norm. The reasons why punishment of this sort is no longer effective, as one
supposes it would b for a very young child, are two-fold. First, in reality the
substantive regularities (norms) are no longer imposed by an all-powerful adult
figure. Instead, they are imposed by a group toward which the individual m~y
feel no sense of loyalty. Second, and in a seemingly paradoxical way, to the
extent the individual has a personal life history of frequent and excessive punishment at the hands of an adult, he responds to group imposed norms with
mixed feelings of guilt and hostility because the group becomes identified with
the old adult figures. The apparent paradox between this second point and the
first noted reason why prison as punishment is ineffective disappears with an
appreciation of the complex interactions being over-simplified here. It is entirely
possible for a given individual to resent the imposition of norms by a group to
which he does not "belong," to violate those norms in a simultaneous bid for
recognition and defiance of adult authority, and to resent punishment while
accepting it as a necessary atonement for his guilt and a confirmation of his
outcast status.
The principal point is that the modern defense of punishment contains
crucial faults of conception and execution. It is absurd to justify punishment as
an aid to socialization of the substantive norms in question when socialization
depends on the development of a sense of solidarity defeated (in part) by pun40. E. Eiuxsog, IDENTrY, YouTH AND CRsis 88 (1968).
41. 3. PiAGET, TBz MoRAL JuDGmNT oF THE CEaLD 54, 88, 228 passim (1965).
42. Id. at 205, 256 passin.
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ishment itself. Punishment is even more absurd when those we punish are, generally, the very individuals who "escaped" socialization to norms "made vivid"
by punishment. 43 Thus the modern defense of punishment is vacuous: it adds
nothing to the classic claims based on the economic model. The normal version
still punishes one group of individuals in order to affect the behavior of a
44
hypothetical group of "marginal" men. *
It is interesting to note here the relevance of two previously discussed moral
claims of the normal version: men-must be treated as ends in themselves and not
merely manipulable bodies, 45 and individuals cannot be used as examples for
others unless one can show they could have acted otherwise than they did. 40
The irony here is that the normal version's "economic" defense of punishment
requires specific violation of these moral imperatives. Those individuals for
whom punishment did not "make vivid" the underlying substantive norms are
punished, are used, in order to deter the hypothetical marginal man. The normal
version fails to see that if punishment is necessary for the socialization of specific norms, where socialization to these norms has nevertheless failed one can
hardly impose blame. Yet the normal version inflicts punishment on such individuals to aid the socialization of others. One can hardly avoid concluding that
on its own terms the normal version is immoral.
The importance of these points must be clear. The specific structure of
the criminal law is irrelevant so long as the end product is social isolation. All
the available evidence points to a configuration of helplessness, social and psychic
isolation and long experience with corporal punishment and other deprivations
and frustrations. To the extent crime is an infraction of the basic requirements
of social solidarity, a violation of the norms of cooperative existence, crime is
evidence of a breakdown in socialization. Enforced solidarity, outcast status as a
punishment for crime, and other forms of exile, can do nothing but aggravate
the problem.
Justice does not need to destroy the future life of an offender. Justice
in our time must be based both on traditional principles and on the
requirements of each individual case. A sentenced criminal is still a
citizen, and he will usually, often after a very short time, become a
free citizen again. When we limit his freedom, we have an obligation
43. "It may even be asked whether the most dangerous offenders or the authors of the
most serious crimes . . . are not precisely those upon whom the threat of punishment has
the least effect." AwCEL, Some Thoughts on the Problem of Deterrence,in CRmx AND CULTURE
375, 378 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1968). "Is it not painfully obvious that such 'training' by the
criminal law does not work effectively?" Diamond, Book Review, 56 CALIF. L. R v. 920, 922
(1968).
44. "I simply refuse to buy the theme . . .that a proper function of the criminal law
is to provide sacrificial victims to support the mythologies of morality, responsibility, and
justice. It is just such cynical disregard of the individual which has so frequently permitted
the official institutions of the administration of criminal justice to become more immoral,
more irresponsible, and more unjust than any single criminal would dare to be." Diamond,
Book Review, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 920, 922 (1968).
45. See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
46. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
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to try 47to motivate him to live a life acceptable to himself and to
others.

Ix
In the construction of a revised version of the criminal law there is a temptation to seek "final solutions" to the question of goals. To the extent that both
crime and illness are endemic to human social life the questions are not whether
crime, but how much; not whether progress can be made, but what kind. 4 In
this section I will try to build the theoretical framework within which the kinds
of conduct to be prevented by the revised version can be defined. The question
"What Conduct is Dangerous" should not, however, be read to imply that the
answer can be found in nature. The answer, on the contrary, takes the form of
value proposals for the reconstruction of the criminal law.
At the outset I would like to make clear the manner in which I think the
problem of goals ought to be considered.
Goals literally conceived have the logical property that their location
and other characteristics as well, can be described independently of
of describing the condition of anyone traveling toward them .... The
contrast with [the goals of] liberty and equality coud hardly be
sharper. The only way we have of telling whether the public interest
has been served is by observing the condition of society....49
To this must be added the observation that the desirability of proposed goals
cannot be determined without considering the conditions necessary for their
attainment. The values underlying the revised version presuppose, for example,
that society is willing to forego institutionalizing the passion for revenge in
favor of utilizing its crime prevention resources in the most rational way. 50
Applied to the question "What Conduct is Dangerous," the principle of rational
resource utilization means that not all types of objectionable conduct may be
designated as dangerous.
I should make it clear that neither the principle of rational resource utilization, the arguments to support it, nor my answer to the question "What Conduct is Dangerous," are fresh. In this section I will argue that only conduct
which presents a direct threat to the person or property of others should be considered dangerous. This view, first articulated fully by J. S. Mill,51 has been
expressed by generations of legal thinkers and social scientists who have either
argued the same proposition on other grounds or have introduced new evidence
tending to support it. Most recently those writing in the tradition of Mill include
47. G. STftUP, TREATING TrE "UNTREATABLE" 245 (1968).
48. Essentially, this is the formulation of the question Freud accepted in dealing with
the difference between normality and neurosis. See P. R=mw, FREuD, THE MIND OF THE
MoRALIsT 354-55 (1959).
49. Braybrooke, The Present and Future of the Concept in V Nomos, THE PUBLIc
INTEREST

143-44 (C. Friedrich, ed. 1964).

50. H. PAcKER, THE Lrrs
OF T E CRmmAL SANCTION 259 (1968).
51. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (1859).
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Schur, Becker, Skolnick and Gusfield among the social scientists, 2 and H. L. A.
Hart, Kadish, Allen, Packer and Williams among the lawyersY 3 It is interesting
to note that Mill's idea has finally reached the pinnacle of legal respectability.
In a recent address the President of the American Bar Association is reported
to have said that the criminal law has come to concern itself with too many kinds
of conduct not directly related to protection of life and property, and has extended itself too far into the area of victimless crimes.54
The revised version is, therefore, an attempt to clarify and synthesize the
propositions of this tradition. It is in the nature of this attempt that all the
arguments and evidence cannot be repeated. Instead, I will try to defend Mill's
proposition from both a subjective and an objective perspective. The subjective
perspective will approach the question of dangerous conduct from the point of
view of the individual in society. The objective perspective will approach the
question of dangerous conduct from the point of view of society as a whole.
The subjective view is from the inside out, the objective view is from the outside in. I hope to show that from both perspectives the same result is possible:
dangerous conduct should be limited to that which presents a direct threat to the
person or property of others.
A.
From the subjective point of view, people may want a given mode of
conduct designated as criminal because it is annoying, or immoral, or because
it is dangerous. Some types of conduct clearly fall into one or another of these
categories, but many others do not. For example, while the noise created by
unmuffied automobiles may certainly be an annoyance, a claim that the raucous
noise is immoral does not readily arise out of the event, and the sense in which
the noise is dangerous is unclear. On the other hand, many types of private
conduct may be considered immoral in themselves and proscribable on this basis
alone. However, if the claim of immorality is not regarded as sufficient to
justify proscription, the claim of dangerousness may be introduced. The claim
of dangerousness is brought in by generalizing the connection between the im52. E. ScHUR, CRIMS WITHOUT VICTIsS (1965); H. BEcKER, OUTSIDERS (1963);
Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance, 15 Soc.
PROBS. 175 (1967); Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue, 41 S.C. L. lMv. 588 (1968).
53. II.A. HART, LAW, LIB'TY AND MoRAIT" (1963); F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRMINAL JUSTICE (1964); KADIsH, Substantive Law Reform and the Limits of Effective
Law Enforcement, U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMassio ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMEISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: TaK COURTS 97-107 (1967), expanded in Kadlish,
The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNALS 157 (1967); H. PACKER, THE LInTS or THE
CR INAL SANcTION (1968); Williams, Authoritarian Morals and the Criminal Law, 1966
CaRm. L. REv. 132. Cf.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 102(1) (a)

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

Of course, there are contemporary defenders of the position taken in opposition to Mill
by James Fitzjames Stephens in LzBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1874). P. DEvWI.,
THn
ENPORCEMtENT OF MORALS (1959); Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J.
987 (1940); E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 45-80 (1962).

54. Remarks of William T. Gossett, President, American Bar Association, February 4,
1969 (A.B.A. News Release).
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moral conduct and the needs of public order. Finally, some types of conduct,
such as the bearing of concealed deadly weapons, are regarded as dangerous in
themselves and proscribable for that reason. Claims of annoyance or immorality
play virtually no role in the demand for criminal designation in such cases.
The difficulty with arguments based on these reasons of annoyance, immorality and dangerousness, lies in determining appropriate terms of discourse.
Whatever the mode of conduct in question may be, it is always possible to
formulate claims which will fit into any of the three categories. It is possible to
argue, for example, that loud and raucous noises frighten pedestrians, disturb
sleep, and interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of leisure hours in the home.
It may be true that unmuffied automobile noise can cause immediate mental or
physical harm only to particularly sensitive individuals,5 5 but the noise may
also-in the long run-damage the emotional well being of the population at
large and cause a drop in population growth and economic production. In short,
in the absence of appropriate terms of discourse it is possible to argue that
the failure to secure an adequate automobile muffler is dangerous conduct.
There are, however, terms which facilitate distinguishing modes of conduct
in terms of dangerousness. From the subjective point of view, conduct should
be considered dangerous only if it is feared. Conduct which only generates
anxiety should not be considered dangerous. The concept of fear denotes an
individual response to a threat which is proximate in time and space. Threats
which are proximate in this sense are objectified by the perceiving individual,
and fear is, in general, the response. On the other hand, threats which are
remote in time or space remain diffuse and conceptual; the threat gives rise
only to anxiety.
The following examples may help to clarify this distinction between fear
and anxiety.
1. Suppose that no law prohibits solicitation to engage in homosexual
relations. It would then be possible (legal) for men and women to solicit their
sexual counterparts in any public place at any time. Heterosexual individuals
may regard the prospect of being solicited for homosexual relations as a direct
temporal and spatial threat to their sexual integrity. This is the sort of threat
which may generate fear.
2. Suppose, on the other hand, that no law prohibits homosexual relations
as such, but solicitation is prohibited. The response to this situation may be
quite different because there is no longer a proximate threat from an objective
source. The threat which is now perceived arises from the fact that homosexuality is a "permitted" form of conduct. Since the conduct is officially
"permitted" the individual may engage in homosexual relations or not as he
chooses; the matter is one of free choice. This sort of freedom, even where the
conduct in question is condemned by prevailing moral norms, generates anxiety
55. Rogers v. Elliot, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888).
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because it opens to the individual possibilities not discounted by authoritative
pronouncements. However, the threat to sexual integrity in this case, because
it is removed, conceptual and non-objective, generates only anxiety.
3. Arson is quite distinct from homosexuality in the quality of its threat.
The threat presented by arson cannot be separated into constituent aspects.
The idea or concept of arson presents no threat distinguishable from the
threat presented by the practice of arson. The threat only arises out of the
potential harm caused by the destruction of a structure by fire. It is certainly
true that in the absence of legal prohibition individuals would be free to choose
whether they will or will not engage in arson. But the moral objections to such
conduct cannot be distinguished from the immediate harmful consequences to
others. There is no removed, diffuse threat arising from the idea of arson; only
the proximate, objective threat of property destruction is present. The individual response is fear, not anxiety.
4. The problem of conspiracy is more difficult than either arson or homosexuality. The normal version rationale for making conspiracy a crime provides
a good place to begin. In general, the rationale for proscribing conspiracy to
commit a substantive crime is linked to the assumed probability that a planned
enterprise involving more than one person is more likely to be carried out and
has greater chance of succeeding. These normal version justifications for proscribing conspiracy attempt to identify the proximate, objective character of
the conduct. The defenders of the normal version have never suggested that
conspiracies are proscribable because they are annoying or immoral apart from
the completed offense. Nor has it ever been suggested that were conspiracies
not prohibited by law the conduct would be impliedly permitted so that individuals would be free to choose whether to conspire or not. Of course were
conspiracies not proscribed one could not be punished for conspiring, but the
moral quality of conspiring is entirely determined by the proximity of the conspiracy to actual criminal conduct. This, I submit, is what the normal version
means by "intent" or "criminal purpose." Planning a crime is morally innocuous
provided it is far removed from actual criminal conduct. Law professors plan
crimes as a regular part of the process of examining students, and mystery story
writers are even more adept and prolific. Undoubtedly, in some circles, the
planning of crimes takes on the character of a parlor game. The point is that
defining proscribed conspiracies as "agreements with the intent to commit a
crime" is an attempt to identify the proximate, objective quality of the threat
presented by the conduct. 56 In short, the argument for proscribing conspiracies
56. The criteria of proximity and objectivity are similar to the tests of proximity (to
the completed actus reus) and equivocality (res ipsa loquitur) applied in determining
whether behavior has 'gone far enough' to constitute an attempt. See The King v. Barker,
[19241 N.Z.L.R. 865 (1924). Essentially, the problem discussed here is the same as that dealt
with earlier in connection with normal version criminality. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text. In both instances the problem is one of inference from relatively ambiguous
data. In this connection consider the possible meanings of the following statement. "They
[those who sought to discover ways of "dispensing with mental states"] floundered on the
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is that they are dangerous. Absent the proximate, objective character of the
threat presented by conspiracies one would be left with the fatuous claim that
they are either annoying or immoral. Conspiracies are dangerous because they
are feared.
Certainly proximity and objectivity are relative matters, questions of
degree, but the question of degree becomes increasingly important as one moves
from threats to individual security and approaches threats to collective security:
those threats which are generally called "political" crimes.-Threats to collective
security are relevant here because the doctrine of conspiracy is a common legal
weapon used in dealing with them.
The criteria of proximity and objectivity is similar to the doctrine of "clear
and present danger" formulated by the Supreme Court in an effort to distinguish
threats which normal version criminality may reach from those which it may
not touch. The relevance at this point of the clear and present danger test is
that it purports to limit the reach of the criminal sanction. Speech which is
colorably protected by the first amendment may be prohibited (punished)
only if it threatens to "turn into" overt conduct which is itself proscribable.
The Supreme Court never denied that "pure speech" may threaten the general
security insofar as it expresses ideas completely at odds with the precepts of
the community. Instead the Court took the position that this sort of threat is
not sufficient to justify invoking the criminal sanction. As a matter of political
dogma "pure speech" is not to be feared. Only when the threat presents a "clear
and present danger" of harm to the collective security may the community resort
to repressive measures.
The theoretical import of this formulation is significant, for while the
explicit purpose of the dogma is a resolution of the conflict between freedom
of expression and collective security, implicit in it is the realization that a
sensitive community may regard almost anything as threatening to its collective
security; within the notion of "threat" there are no principled limitations. The
Supreme Court supplied a dogma to fill the gap in principle: a threat to collective security may only be suppressed when it is feared, and it may only be
feared when it presents a "clear and present danger" of overt conduct which
is itself proscribable.
There is another way of looking at the "clear and present danger" test
which brings it closer to this discussion of conspiracy. The distinction between
rocks of the criminal law and other branches of law which are intelligible only if mental
states are considered. The external behavior of an intentional killer, a negligent one, and a
mistaken one might be identical. The significant differences are ascertainable only by discovery
of the respectively different states of mind, for example, whether putting a spoonful of sugar
into another person's cup of tea was an innocent act or an attempt to kill. Of course, an
inference regarding another's state of mind must be based on observable actions or on talk,
including confession; but the actor can immediately disclose his state of mind. It is also true
that one makes many decisions that are never carried out; only he has knowledge of those
mental states. Thus dependence on external actions in fact-finding and the existence of
internal states are very different matters." Hall, Analytic Philosophy and Jurisprudence,77
Emcs 14, 24 (1966) (emphases added).
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threats which the community may not suppress with the criminal sanction
("pure speech") and those which it may ("clear and present danger") can be
read as an effort to distinguish real threats from mere symptoms. Speech or
advocacy of ideas do not pose real threats but action does. The community
effort to interfere before the point of action is simply a device to effectively
guard itself from the effects of the action. (As I pointed out earlier, invoking
the criminal sanction against nonpolitical conspiracies is only an efficient means
for protecting against the real threat: commission of the substantive offense.)
This is well recognized in the literature, but I have mentioned it here in order
to make the point that conspiracies are not necessarily dangerous in themselves.
They may only be a symptom of some other threat which is feared. To regard
conspiracies as per se dangerous is a perilous step to the extent it moves the
criminal law away from that area within which it functions best and most
securely: the prevention of dangerous conduct.
The four examples discussed in this section should clarify the way in which
the notion of fear and anxiety help designate the kinds of conduct which are
properly called dangerous. In one sense there is more to this than merely a
word game, but in another sense all that is involved is a choice of terms. If we
use words to designate classes of conduct there should be something about
the character of the class that justifies the inclusion of any particular member.
This means that the designation of dangerousness should include modes of
behavior which have something in common apart from the fact that they are
all called dangerous. On the other hand, it is always necessary to decide
whether a particular term is to be applied to a class that exhibits at least one
common characteristic. Whether all modes of conduct which evoke a fear response should be designated as dangerous is a question of value, and should
remain so. The verbal aspect of the problem becomes particularly serious when
the question is whether individuals who present some sort of threat to themselves should be considered dangerous for public law purposes. Because conceptual clarity often breaks down on this question it is worth dealing with
separately.
There are innumerable ways in which an individual may be a threat to his
own physical safety or his own life. These sources of danger range from suicidal
tendencies to mere ignorance, poor judgment or carelessness; with conditions
like senility, epilepsy, amnesia, inebriation, chemically induced hallucination,
and proneness to coronary arrest lying somewhere in between. The normal
version draws an unarticulated distinction between threats from sources which
produce risks regarded as inherent in ordinary social life, and risks regarded
as extraordinary. On the other hand, this social distinction may be framed
in terms of the individual characteristic of rationality. In some instances the
individual may be able to "rationally make choices" which endanger his life,
while in other instances the individual may be unable to make the "choices"
necessary to avoid situations of personal threat. As a practical matter, the
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question of when, and in what way, the social order should interfere to protect
individuals from themselves may be answered in terms of the capacity of the
individual for rational choice.
The justifiability of social interference to prevent self-harm is not adequately explained either by the notion of "ordinary risk" or by the criterion
of rationality. The unarticulated distinction between threats which are inherent
in ordinary social life and those which are extraordinary begs the question:
Why are threats from some sources a matter of "let the chips fall where they
may" while threats from other sources call for positive social action? Nor does
the allegedly individual characteristic of rationality help to explain the distinction for the purpose of classification. Whether an individual is rational enough
to avoid a particular threat is a question of particular "fact" and not a question
which can be answered by reference to the nature of the threat. Some people
may be rational with regard to certain threats and quite irrational with regard
to others. The matter is finally confounded by the elusive quality of reason and
the difficulty of determining where rationality ends and fantasy begins.
Professor Dershowitz has recently compared two cases which nicely illustrate the problem. 57 In one case Justice Robert H. Jackson, at the age of 62,
was warned by his physicians that if he continued to work he ran the risk of a
fatal heart attack. Justice Jackson chose to run that risk and died shortly thereafter. In the second case, Mrs. Lake was committed to a mental hospital because
she was found wandering the streets in a state of confusion. Mrs. Lake suffered
from arteriosclerosis which brought on periods of confusion interrupting periods
of rationality. On petition for release, Mrs. Lake testified that she realized her
problem but would prefer to risk her life rather than live out her days in a
mental hospital. Her petition was denied.
The distinction between these two cases, in terms of the principles I have
been discussing, is that either the threat of coronary arrest is an ordinary risk
of social life, or Justice Jackson was rational while Mrs. Lake was not. But
these principles do not explain why heart attack is an ordinary risk of social life
while the mental effect of arteriosclerosis is not, or in what sense Justice
Jackson is more rational than Mrs. Lake.
In my view, the real distinction between these two cases in terms of social
response can be found in the premises of the normal version, in the notion of
moral responsibility. Earlier, I tried to show that moral responsibility was the
key concept in the normal version. In its criminal aspect, the fact of a provable
crime leads to an inference of dangerous mental condition (moral responsibility).
In its civil aspect, dangerous mental condition leads to an inference of potential
dangerous conduct (non-responsibility). In terms of self-harm, this means the
normal version will interfere whenever there is serious doubt that the individual
57. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways, 2 PSYcEOLOGY TODAY No. 9, 43, 47 (1969) also printed in 57 JuDncATuRE 370,
375 (1968).
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can be held morally responsible for what he may do to himself. The primary
social interest lies in protecting the validity of the assumption that all autonomous citizens are morally responsible for what they do. The two cases presented by Professor Dershowitz can be explained in terms of this interest:
Justice Jackson is regarded as morally responsible for his choice, but there is
serious question whether Mrs. Lake is morally responsible for hers.
Where there is reason to question the moral responsibility of an individual,
the normal version claims the right to interfere, but it pretends its motive is
altruistic. Statutory formulations such as "in need of care or treatment,"
"unable to care for himself," or "presents a danger to himself,"r5 8 whether or not
honored in practice, 59 certainly reflect this apparent altruistic motivation.
Altruism is not, however, the social interest justifying these statutes. The social
whole is, I believe, primarily concerned with protecting itself against individuals
who are irresponsible in the moral sense. A society which regards itself as individualistic must presuppose that its members are morally responsible for what
they do. 60 In practice this must be more than a supposition, it must be a presumption. Consequently, when there is reason to believe that a particular individual could not be held morally responsible if he were to do something
harmful to himself, society feels it must take action. If it does not take action
it creates, in effect, two classes of citizens: those presumed to be responsible
and those to whom the presumption does not apply.
There is an additional reason why society feels it must take action with
regard to an individual whom it suspects may not be morally responsible for
actions harmful to himself. If an individual does violence to himself there are
only two alternative responses: "He did wrong, it's his own fault," or, "poor
fellow, he didn't know what he was doing." The normal version, for reasons
having more to do with tradition than anything else, feels competent to deal
with the former and uneasy with respect to the latter. This uneasiness is compounded by the realization that the line between "it's his own fault" and "he
didn't know what he was doing" often seems to be drawn in lemon juice.
58. F. LINDmx & D. McINTYRE, THz MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17-18
(1961).
59.

See generally, R. Rocx, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE or THE MENTALLY

ILL

(1968).
60. "We tend to hold ourselves, and others, responsible for every act. From childhood,
each of us is subjected to a system of rewards and punishments designed to make us feel
obligations of responsibility to ourselves, our families, community and nation. We are
taught to believe that the obligation of developing responsibility is ours, individually. Whenever a man loses his self-control, gives way to his aggressive impulses, commits a heinous
crime and then asserts that he is not responsible for it, each of us is endangered to the
extent that we look upon ourselves as a person capable of committing the same act. A man's
plea of irresponsibility in such a situation threatens to weaken our personal controls over
our aggressive impulses. In this situation we find ourselves in conflict between our feelings
of self-blame and a desire to blame others. In addition, there is the necessity of deciding
whether the offender should be condemned as a criminal or regarded generously and compassionately as mentally ill." Morris, The Insanity Defense and a "Jury" Experiment, 43
WASH. L. REv. 623, 631-32 (1968).
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Thus the interest in protecting society against individuals who are morally
irresponsible becomes significant because of the problem of the presumption,
and because o6f the reactive dilemma. Altruism plays no part in the social motivation here. The altruism rhetoric is only important to the extent society is unsure
of the validity of its real concern. This unsureness can be remedied by presenting the individual interest and the social interest as congruent, and the
rhetoric or altruism performs this function. If it is in society's interest to protect
itself against individuals suspected of being irresponsible in the moral sense,
then surely it is in the interests of the individual to be prevented from engaging
in conduct for which he may not be responsible. The individual is held to be
just as interested in morally responsible action as the social whole. In this way
social interference with individual autonomy is readily justified.
Putting altruism aside, it is necessary to deal with the real social interest,
as I have presented it, within the context of this section. Our original question
was whether individuals who presented some sort of threat to themselves should
be considered dangerous for public law purposes. The next step is to ask
whether moral irresponsibility, insofar as it may be manifested in self harm,
should be considered dangerous from the subjective perspective of the individual in society.
From the subjective point of view, the individual who may be morally
irresponsible for acts harmful to himself presents a threat which can only generate anxiety. By definition, self-harm presents no direct, objective threat to
anyone else. Only the characteristic of moral irresponsibility can have some
kind of general significance. The nature of this general significance is identified
by the problem of the presumption and the reactive dilemma. From the subjective point of view, if the individual cannot presume that all men with whom
he has contact are morally responsible for their actions he is thrown into uncertainty; he must determine the responsibility of others for himself and on an
ad hoc basis. This uncertainty, this inability to presume the moral responsibility
of others, tends to generate anxiety. The same conclusion follows from the
reactive dilemma. Absent the presumption of moral responsibility, the individual in society is more likely to impute fault in an inappropriate case. He is
more likely to say "it's his own fault" where he should say "poor fellow, he didn't
know what he was doing." The possibility that one will pass inappropriate judgments may generate anxiety as well as guilt. The potential for guilt in this
situation has an additional aspect relevant to the generation of anxiety. Morally
irresponsible people are often regarded as children; they require care and supervision for their own protection. Iniofar as they are regarded as children a moral
duty to act is imposed upon everybody. The effect of this duty is the realization
that one may fail to act when one is under a moral duty to do so. This realization may generate apprehension and guilt.
The nature of the threat presented by morally irresponsible people is, from
the subjective point of view, a moral threat. The threat is not from an objective
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source, and it is neither direct nor immediate. This means that individuals who
present some sort of threat to themselves, who may not be morally responsible
for their acts of self-harm, should not be considered dangerous.
I am not proposing that society take no action with regard to individuals
who may harm themselves. This analysis proposes only that such people should
not be considered dangerous in the sense that term is being used here. From
the public law point of view activities which are annoying or immoral should be
treated differently from those which are dangerous in order to allocate scarce
resources in a rational way, and to avoid social conflicts wherever possible. The
criminal law should be concerned with dangerousness only, and that means
threats which generate fear, not merely anxiety.
B.
From the objective point of view, from the point of view of society as a
whole, dangerous conduct should be limited to that which presents a direct
threat to the person or property of others. The reasoning here is similar to that
used in the preceding section dealing with the subjective point of view. The
designation of dangerousness should be limited to threats which generate fear
rather than anxiety. However, the relevance of this distinction is somewhat
different when one looks at the problem from the objective perspective. From
the point of view of the social whole, the relevance of the distinction lies in the
difference between the way individuals are likely to adapt to threats which
generate fear, on the one hand, and their adaptation to threats which generate
anxiety on the other. The question of adaptation is crucial for public law
purposes.
In general, threats which generate fear will evoke affirmative, often violent,
action. An individual who fears a certain threat does so because his integrity,
in the broad sense, is at stake. When the integrity of the individual is at stake
formal norms are, at best, only marginally effective in controlling the character
of the response. The maintenance or protection of individual integrity is of
primary importance in the presence of acute stress. For this reason mature
societies have long recognized that individual self-help generally tends to
reproduce violence and antagonism. If the legal order does nothing else it must
be concerned with eliminating the need for self-help as a response to threats
which generate fear.
Threats which generate anxiety, however, do not generally evoke adaptive
responses of an affirmative, violent character. Primarily, the adaptive mode
employed here is the formulation of norms of morality, or drawing upon custom
or tradition, in an effort to narrow the range of choices open to individuals and
eliminate the "freedom" to engage in behavior which generates anxiety.0 ' This
61. Erikson has observed that moral rules of conduct are based on a fear of threats
to be forestalled. E. Ea-xsow, The Golden Ride in the Light of New Insight, in INSIOnT
AND RESPONSIBILITy

219, 222 (1964). In this regard it would seem that James Marshall's
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mode of adaptation to threats which generate anxiety is possible only because
the integrity of the individual is not at stake. In terms of the examples used
earlier, unmuffled automobile noise, the "existence" of homosexual behavior,
and morally irresponsible individuals, do not present a threat to the integrity
of the individual: these threats are not feared. Consequently, affirmative, violent
self-help is an unlikely mode of adaptation.
There is an additional reason why, from the objective point of view, the
designation of dangerousness should be limited to threats which generate fear.
Law shares with morality, custom and tradition the characteristic of being a
mechanism of social ordering. 2 But it does not follow from this common characteristic that these mechanisms of social ordering are fungible. While it may
not be possible to clearly proscribe or even describe the ideal functions of each
it is certainly possible and necessary to propose that law should be limited in its
functions, and to describe the sources of such limitations.
Both law and morality function, in the psychological sense, as defenses
against internal and external threats.6 3 Essentially I have thus far proposed that
the defensive function of the criminal law should be limited to defending against
those threats which generate fear. By implication, then, I am proposing that
the criminal law play no part in defending against anxiety-producing threats,
but that this function be left to moral and customary norms. What follows is
an attempt to defend this proposal.
There are no "natural" limitations on the uses of the criminal law. At best
there are a few constitutional limitations, but beyond that the criminal law is
bounded only by political possibilities. Of course there may exist within the
inherited morality of the culture a certain sense of limitation, but it is hard to
believe that this sense is either sufficiently strong or articulate to counteract
intellectual knowledge of the absence of limits. In theory, then, any mode
of behavior may be designated as criminal if such designation is backed by a
sufficient political force. It is this political character of all criminal codes that
allows for development and change as well as repression and rigidity.
The theoretical flexibility of the criminal law tends to breed the assurance
that at least in some sense political society is still in control of itself. On the
other hand, the absence of inherent limits on the uses of the criminal law tends
to breed the feeling that someday anyone's ordinary modes of behavior may be
designated as criminal. The point here is that in the absence of some external
inference is somewhat loaded. "However, observance of social norms is a defense against
personal instability which occurs when one is socially dissident." J. MARSHAL, INTENTIONIx LAW AND Socim 180 (1968).
62. H. KELSEN, WHAT Is JusTicE 231 ff. (1957).
63. "Much of what we ascribe to neurotic anxiety and much of what we ascribe to
existential dread is really only man's distinctive form of fear: for as an animal, for the sake
of survival, scans near and far with specialized senses fit for a special environment, man
must scan both his inner and his outer environment for indications of permissible activity
and for promises of identity." E. E~ixsox, Identity and Uprootedness in Our Times, in
INSIGnT AND RESPONSIBILITY

103 (Norton, 1964).
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"test" the criminal law may itself generate anxiety. This is particularly true to
the extent the criminal law is a relatively simple and putatively effective weapon
against disapproved behavior. In times of stress it is too often the first choice
of those seeking simple solutions to complex social problems. To the extent any
mode of behavior may, in theory, be designated as criminal, the criminal law
becomes an all-purpose defense mechanism, an event which, according to the
law of parsimony, weakens its defensive power. Society cannot be too aware that
the content of the criminal law depends on the fickle sway of political forces.
It has rightly been observed that the defensive force of any criminal statute
depends on a broad consensus respecting the validity of its objective.0 This
need for consensus has generally been explained on the basis of the needs of law
enforcement, but I think there is a more fundamental reason. The absence of
broad consensus respecting the validity of the objective of any criminal statute
brings about consciousness of the political character of criminal designations,
and consequently generates anxiety through the realization that any mode of
behavior may be designated as criminal.
These observations support the proposal that the function of the criminal
law be limited to a defense against threats which are feared. Modes of behavior
which generate anxiety because they threaten the stability of the moral order, or
because they question the moral "necessity" of any contrary mode of behavior,
should be dealt with by the non-legal mechanisms of social ordering. A rational 0
determination of the extent to which a particular mode of behavior presents a
threat which is feared, therefore, serves both the pragmatic and theoretical
needs of the legal system. It designates as criminal those modes of behavior
which are likely to provoke violence in defense of personal integrity, and it conserves the seriousness and moral effectiveness of the community's designations.
In Part II, I will discuss the notion of fear as it relates to more traditional
theories about the province of the criminal law. That is, it has been argued
that there are limits to what the criminal law can and should do. Some of these
theories have taken the position that the criminal law, because it does or ought
to reflect those values which are essential to the maintenance of order, ought to
be concerned with a "heartland" of protectable social interests. Other commentators have taken a more pragmatic approach and suggested that the
limits can be found in procedural necessity and the consequences of moral
pluralism. Here I will argue that in any event the result is the same; fear is
the characteristic which distinguishes the proper from the improper concern of
the criminal law.
64. H. PAcxER, THF LmnTs or =x CRz
rAL SA cTIoN 261-64 (1968).
65. Fear is the premise. Reason operates to "score" the enterprise. Fried, Reason and
Action, 11 NAT. L.F. 13, 23 (1966). See also Kaplan, Some Limits on Rationality in VII
Nomos, RATIONAL DEcis oN 55, 57 (C. Friedrich, ed. 1964); S. FREUD, FuTUnE OF AN IL,

siox 86 (1928); P. R=, FREUD: Tm MInD OF

E MoRALIsT 325 (1959).
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The final sections of Part II will deal with some more removed yet essential questions. First, I will deal with the relation between abstract criminality
and behavior in terms of the dichotomy between chaos and certainty. The dichotomy between chaos and certainty is reflected in the legal notions of "clear
and present danger" and "strict liability." I will argue that the difference between the concept of "clear and present danger" and that of "strict liability" is
not in the quantity of chaos or certainty, but in the quality of the certainty or
chaos implied by the distinction. In concrete terms, a system employing "strict
liability" for acts implies a kind of chaos in that the notion of innocence largely
disappears: everyone may be criminal at any moment since even mere accident
is not a defense. On the other hand, "clear and present danger" implies a kind
of chaos resulting from lack of clarity as to where the danger point lies in any
particular instance.
The dichotomy between chaos and certainty, in turn, raises serious questions about The Rule of Law, particularly with regard to the relation between
crime and revolution. With respect to this question I will point out that the
social response to an act of crime is always ambivalent because one is never
certain whether the act is merely the result of meanness, or whether it implies
a total rejection of social authority or the particular social system. Crime is a
subspecies of revolution, the revolution may be a type of crime. To the extent
one recognizes this relationship, the moral vigor in the assertion of the preeminence of The Rule of Law is substantially weakened. The relative strength
of the moral claim to the pre-eminence of The Rule of Law, I will argue, always
depends on the relative strength of the sense of social solidarity pertaining at
the time.
Finally, I will try to. point out that because the pre-eminence of The Rule
of Law depends on the relative strength of the sense of social solidarity, the
disposition of dangerous (criminal) offenders only makes sense to the extent
that it attempts to strengthen the individual's sense of solidarity with the group,
and loyalty to it.

